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SAVING THE DEIFIC DECREE EXCEPTION
TO THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN ILLINOIS:
HOW A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF
“RELIGIOUS COMMAND” MAY CURE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CONCERNS
BELLA FEINSTEIN*
I.

INTRODUCTION

And [God] said, Please take your son, your only one, whom you love
— Issac — go to the land of Moriah, and bring him up there as an
offering . . . .1
[A] man that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory,
and doth not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a
brute, or a wild beast, such a one is never the object of punishment.2

It seems logical to conclude that a defendant who killed
someone because “the voice of God” commanded him to is suffering
from a mental illness. It also seems logical to take this conclusion
one step further and deduce that the defendant is “insane.” Or is
it? Although courts are divided on this issue, this deduction serves
as the underlying premise behind the deific decree exception to the
insanity defense. Under the deific decree exception, a defendant
who is commanded to perform an act by God can be found not
guilty by reason of insanity even though he seemingly understands
the “nature and quality” of his act and its legal “wrongness.”3 The
defendant’s primary deficiency is a moral one.4 Courts hold that
this “moral deficiency” is a get-out-of-jail-free card.
The deific decree exception came under fire in a recent
Seventh Circuit decision.5 The Court expressed concerns that the
exception violates the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause

* Bella Feinstein is a third-year student at The John Marshall Law School.
Bella would like to thank her family and friends, especially Dan Feinstein,
and Anna and Vladimir Feldbaum, for all of their support and help along the
way.
1. Genesis 22:2 (Sapirstein Edition).
2. Trial of Edward Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 765 (Eng. 1724). This
quote articulates the “Wild Beast Test,” one of the earliest tests used to assess
criminal insanity. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 616 (2d Cir. 1966).
3. State v. Potter, 842 P.2d 481, 486 (Wash. App. 1992).
4. Id.
5. Wilson v. Gaetz, 608 F.3d 347, 354 (7th Cir. 2010).
561
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because it gives preferential treatment to “religious
hallucinations” over “non-religious” ones.6
In Part II, this Comment provides an overview of the three
tests that courts use to evaluate a defendant’s sanity as well as a
discussion of Illinois’s approach to the insanity defense. In Part
III, this Comment analyzes the origins of the deific decree
exception and how courts have applied it in Illinois. Finally, in
Part IV, this Comment evaluates the constitutionality of the deific
decree exception. The Comment concludes that although a narrow
application of the deific decree exception violates the
Establishment Clause, a broader application is constitutional.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Evolution of the Insanity Defense
The insanity defense has the reputation of being a get-out-ofjail-free card.7 In fact, defendants denied an insanity defense often
complain that juries rely on their misconceptions about insanity
defense “abuse” in rejecting insanity defenses.8 In actuality, the
insanity defense is invoked in less than one percent of felony cases
and is successful in only a small fraction of those cases.9
There are three tests courts use to evaluate a defendant’s
sanity. The McNaughton10 test is the most widely used of the
6. Id.
7. See Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology
of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 609-11 (1990)
(arguing society’s misconceptions about the insanity defense stem from the
media’s focus on only the most sensational insanity plea cases).
8. See People v. Pasch, 604 N.E.2d 294, 307 (Ill. 1992) (upholding the trial
court’s decision to deny the defendant’s challenge for cause on the grounds
that jurors who voiced skepticism regarding the insanity defense during voir
dire subsequently indicated they would evaluate the defendant’s sanity on the
merits); see also People v. Seuffer, 582 N.E.2d 71, 78 (Ill. 1991) (rejecting
defendant’s mistrial claim on the basis that the none of the prospective jurors
that voiced skepticism about the insanity defense were actually selected to
serve on the jury).
9. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
108 (Carolina Academic Press 1994).
10. The McNaughton test originated from “McNaughten’s Case.” Regina v.
McNaughten, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 719 (1843). Daniel McNaughton was accused of
murdering the British Prime Minister’s secretary, whom he believed to be the
Prime Minister at the time. See RICHARD MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM
WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF DANIEL MCNAUGHTAN 11 (Free Press
2000). At trial, McNaughton asserted that “[t]he Tories in my native city have
compelled me to do this.” Id. at 10. The court found McNaughton not guilty by
reason of insanity. Id. at 19. Public outcry after the verdict led to a meeting of
the House of Lords for the purpose of clarifying the insanity defense. Id. at 22.
The outcome of this meeting serves as the basis for the McNaughton test. Id.
at 23.
Courts and legal commentators have spelled “McNaughton” in various
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tests.11 To be found insane under the McNaughton test, a
defendant must prove that at the time he committed his crime he
was “laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing
what was wrong.”12
Although more than half the states have adopted the

ways. See id. at xi (noting that “McNaughton” has been spelled in at least
twelve different ways).
11. More than half the states have adopted some variation of the
McNaughton test. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A–3–1 (1975); ALASKA STAT. ANN.
§ 12.47.010(a) (West 1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502(a) (1956); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 25(b) (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16–8–101, 16–8–
101.5 (West 1986 & Supp. 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.027 (West 2000); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 16–3–2, 16–3–3, 16–3–28 (West 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 35–
41–3–6 (West 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.4 (West 1993); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:14 (1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.026 (West 1987); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 546-14-101 (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4–1 (West 1995); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 40.15 (McKinney 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(A)(14) (West
1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161 (West 1998); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 315 (West 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17–24–10(a) (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 22-1-2(20) (1983); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (West 1973); WASH REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.12.010 (West 1988); Laney v. State, 486 So.2d 1242, 1245
(Miss. 1986); State v. Hotz, 795 N.W.2d 645, 653 (Neb. 2011); Finger v. State,
27 P.3d 66, 76 (Nev. 2001), cert. denied 534 U.S. 1127 (2002); State v. Hartley,
565 P.2d 658, 660 (N.M. 1977); State v. Helms, 201 S.E.2d 850, 854 (N.C.
1974); Reid v. Taylor, Case No. 00-C-V00859, 2002 WL 31107536, *13 (W.D.
Va. Sept. 23, 2002).
12. McNaughten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722. Because the McNaughton test does
not provide a definition of “wrongness,” courts have taken vastly different
approaches in defining it. See Bageshree Ranade, Conceptual Ambiguities in
the Insanity Defense: State v. Wilson and the New “Wrongfulness” Standard,
30 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1378 (1998) (noting that courts have defined
“wrongfulness” as “contrary to the law,” “contrary to one’s own conscience” and
contrary to “societal morality”). Some courts define “wrong” to mean “against
the law.” See, e.g., McElroy v. State, 242 S.W. 883, 884-85 (Tenn. 1922); State
v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488, 491 (Wash. 1983). Other courts define “wrong” to
mean “contrary to societal morals.” See, e.g., State v. Corley, 495 P.2d 470, 473
(Ariz. 1972); People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 761 (Cal. 1985); State v.
Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180, 187 (Iowa 1979); State v. Di Paolo, 168 A.2d 401,
408 (N.J. 1961); People v. Wood, 187 N.E.2d 116, 121 (N.Y. 1962). Courts that
have adopted a “moral wrongness” standard generally employ an objective
definition of morality. See United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 620 (7th Cir.
2007) (“Moral wrongfulness is determined by reference to societal or public
standards of morality.”); People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 138 (Colo. 1992)
(noting that insanity is measured “by existing societal standards of morality
rather than by defendant’s personal and subjective understanding of legality”);
Wood, 187 N.E.2d at 121 (“the law does not mean to permit the individual to
be his own judge of what is right or wrong”). A subjective definition of morality
would be impractical. See State v. Reece, 486 P.2d 1088, 1090 (Wash. 1971)
(asserting that psychiatrists “cannot crawl into a defendant’s cranium and
determine for the court information as subjective as whether the defendant
knew or appreciated the difference between right and wrong”).
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McNaughton test,13 some courts criticize the test for being “too
simplistic.”14 These courts assert that a defendant may understand
the legal or moral “wrongness” of his crime yet nevertheless be
unable to stop himself from committing it.15 This criticism has led
several courts to adopt the McNaughton test in conjunction with
the irresistible impulse test.16
Whereas the McNaughton test focuses on the defendant’s
knowledge of right and wrong, the irresistible impulse test—
commonly referred to as the “police at the elbow test”17—focuses
on whether the defendant had the ability to choose “right” in the
first place.18 This test asks one question: Would the defendant
have committed the crime had a police officer been standing at his
elbow?19
Under the irresistible impulse test, a defendant is not guilty
by reason of insanity if a mental illness so overwhelmed his
“reason, conscience and judgment” that he acted from an
“irresistible and incontrollable impulse” rather than voluntary
choice.20 Thus, a defendant may very well understand the nature
of his crime, yet still be found not guilty by reason of insanity
because he lacked volition.21
The irresistible impulse test is unpopular among the states22
13. Potter, 842 P.2d at 486.
14. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 620 (2d Cir. 1966) (evaluating
the McNaughton test as “too simplistic” for “today’s complex and sophisticated
society”); see also United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 726 (6th Cir. 1968)
(finding that the McNaughton test is “deficient as an exclusive test” because it
only applies to a limited class of insane defendants).
15. See Smith, 404 F.2d at 725 (explaining that “[t]here are many forms of
mental illness where the illness may be serious enough to deprive the person
concerned of any actual choice of conduct where nonetheless he does possess
knowledge of what is right or wrong in legal or moral terms.”); Hill v. State,
251 N.E.2d 429, 433 (Ind. 1969) (denying that a defendant who knows it is
wrong to inflict bodily harm on another is always capable of controlling his
impulse to commit the act); Commw. of Pa. v. Weinstein, 451 A.2d 1344, 1349
(Pa. 1982) (stating that the McNaughton test incorrectly presupposes that a
defendant always has the freedom to choose wrong over right).
16. See Hartley, 565 P.2d at 661 (noting that New Mexico courts will
consider “irresistible impulses” in evaluating an insanity defense, but these
impulses standing alone are insufficient for an insanity acquittal); Bennett v.
Commw. of Va., 511 S.E.2d 439, 446 (Va. App. 2001) (recognizing that under
Virginia law a defendant can establish criminal insanity using either the
McNaughton or irresistible impulse tests).
17. JOHN A. SCHINKA, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH METHODS IN
PSYCHOLOGY 391 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2003).
18. Maxwell v. United States, 368 F.2d 735, 741 (9th Cir. 1966).
19. Cecil v. Commw. of Ky., 888 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Ky. 1994).
20. Id.
OF
EVERYDAY
LAW,
21. Insanity
Defense,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
http://www.enotes.com/everyday-law-encyclopedia/insanitydefense#irresistible-impulse-test (last visited Dec. 22, 2012).
22. See, e.g., Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1139 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating
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and has been bombarded with criticism by the Supreme Court.23
Currently, no state relies solely on this test to evaluate a
defendant’s sanity.24
Criticism of the McNaughton and irresistible impulse
Iinsanity tests led the American Law Institute to devise a new
approach to the insanity defense for the 1962 Model Penal Code.25
Under the Model Penal Code, “[a] person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of
mental disease or defect he lack[ed] substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law.”26
Although the Model Penal Code combines elements of both
the McNaughton and irresistible impulse tests, it eases the burden
on a defendant.27 Unlike the other tests, which impose “absolute
knowledge” or “absolute control” requirements, the Model Penal
Code requires a defendant to demonstrate that he lacked
“substantial capacity” to appreciate his conduct or conform to the
law.28 Only seventeen states and the District of Columbia have
adopted the Model Penal Code test.29

that the irresistible impulse test is unpopular in Georgia).
23. See State v. Wilson, 306 S.C. 498, 506 (1992) (stating that “[t]he
irresistible impulse test is very difficult, if not impossible, to apply with
accuracy” and has been “plagued by internal debate over its validity within the
profession of psychiatry.”); Leland v. State of Or., 343 U.S. 790, 801 (1952)
(finding that “adoption of the irresistible impulse test is not ‘implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty’”).
24. State v. Finn, 100 N.W.2d 508, 511 (Minn. 1960).
25. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EVERYDAY LAW, supra note 21.
26. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Official Draft 1962).
27. WAYNE L. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 329-30 (2d
ed. 1986).
28. Id. Four circuits that have expressed approval of the Model Penal Code
test prefer the word “criminality” be replaced with “wrongfulness.” See
Freeman, 357 F.2d at 622; United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 245 (5th Cir.
1984); United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1967) (en banc),
superseded by statute on another point as stated in Ewing, 494 F.3d at 619;
Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 71 (9th Cir. 1970). This modification
“exclude[s] from the criminally responsible category those who, knowing an act
to be criminal, committed it because of a delusion that the act was morally
justified.” Wade, 426 F.2d at 71.
29. More than twenty states have adopted at least one prong of the Model
Penal Code test. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-312 (West 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-13 (West 1969); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-400 (West 1972); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-2 (West 1961); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.020 (West
1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17–A, § 39 (1983); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
PROC. § 3–109 (West 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 1 (West 2008);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANNOTATED § 768.36 (West 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 12.1-04.1-01 (West 1985); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.295 (West 1971); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39–11–501 (1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4801 (West 1983);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.15 (West 1969); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-304 (West
1977); Pegues v. United States, 415 A.2d 1374, 1378 (D.C. 1980); State v.
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B. A New Verdict to Appease the People
The “guilty but mentally ill” verdict emerged in the mid-1980s
as an alternative to the traditional verdicts of guilty, not guilty,
and not guilty by reason of insanity.30 It was intended as a
“compromise verdict”; the defendant pays for his crime by serving
a long prison sentence while at the same time getting the
treatment he needs.31 A verdict of “guilty but mentally ill” says
three things about a defendant: (1) he is guilty of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt; (2) he was not legally insane at the time he
committed the crime; and (3) he was suffering from a mental
Johnson, 399 A.2d 469, 476 (R.I. 1979). Even jurisdictions that have expressed
approval of the Model Penal Code test admit that it is not perfect. See
Freeman, 357 F.2d at 623 (noting that, although the Model Penal Code test is
not perfect, “[p]erfection is unattainable when we are dealing with a fluid and
evolving science”); Johnson, 399 A.2d at 475-76 (concluding that the Model
Penal Code test is a significant improvement over prior insanity tests even
though it is not perfect); Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531, 541 (Tenn. 1977)
(stating that, although the Model Penal Code test “is not perfect and will itself
produce problems, . . . it is the best test of insanity in existence today”).
30. See, e.g., People v. McCumber, 477 N.E.2d 525, 552 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)
(explaining the differences between “insanity” and “guilty but mentally ill”
verdicts). The “guilty but mentally ill” verdict emerged in response to the trial
of John Hinckley. Mark A. Woodmansee, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict:
Political Expediency at the Expense of Moral Principle, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 341, 344 (1996). Hinckley attempted to assassinate
President Ronald Reagan in 1981. United States v. Hinckley, 292 F. Supp. 2d
125, 126 (D.D.C. 2003). At trial, a jury found Hinckley not guilty by reason of
insanity. Id. at 127. The public was outraged by this verdict. See Irving R.
Kaufman, The Insanity Plea on Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 1982),
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/09/12/magazine/l-the-insanity-plea-on-trial145233.html (noting that “outrage over the verdict was immediate and
intense”). Within three years of the trial, half the states placed additional
restrictions on the use of the insanity defense, and Utah abolished the
insanity defense altogether. Kimberly Collins et al., The John Hinckley Trial
& Its Effect on the Insanity Defense, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/
ftrials/hinckley/hinckleyinsanity.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2012).
31. See William F. Smith, Limiting the Insanity Defense: A Rational
Approach to Irrational Crimes, 47 MO. L. REV. 605, 614 (1982) (interpreting a
“guilty but legally insane verdict” as “a point of compromise or as a means of
providing recognition of responsibility while assuring some form of
consideration of the defendant’s mental state at the sentencing stage of the
proceedings”). In practice, this compromise verdict has failed on all fronts.
Although proponents of the verdict believed it would “reduce the number of
insanity acquittals,” it appears that it has actually had the opposite effect. See
Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose Time
Should Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494, 507 (1985) (finding that,
because some states now require a plea of insanity as a prerequisite for a
“guilty but legally insane” verdict, the number of not guilty by reason of
insanity verdicts may actually have risen). Moreover, many defendants have
not received the treatment their sentences promised. Amy D. Gundlach-Evans,
State v. Calin: The Paradox of the Insanity Defense and Guilty but Mentally Ill
Statute, Recognizing Impairment Without Affording Treatment, 51 S.D. L.
REV. 122, 143 (2006).
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illness at the time he committed the crime.32 Illinois is among the
thirteen states that have adopted this verdict.33
C. Where Illinois Stands with the Insanity Defense
Before 1863, Illinois courts adhered to the early common law
rule that a defendant who pled insanity had to demonstrate that
he was “totally deprived of understanding and memory” at the
time he committed the crime.34 The Illinois Supreme Court
modified this rule in 1863, adopting a test that encompassed both
the McNaughton and irresistible impulse tests.35 Under this
modified test, a defendant was exempt from punishment if he had
an uncontrollable impulse to commit the crime that overrode his
judgment and overcame his ability to choose right over wrong.36
In 1961, the Illinois legislature passed a statute adopting the
Model Penal Code test.37 Thirty years later Illinois eliminated the
second prong of this test.38 As the test stands today, a defendant is
not guilty by reason of insanity “if at the time of [his] conduct, as a
result of mental disease or mental defect, he lacks substantial
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.”39

32. People v. Fierer, 503 N.E.2d 594, 598 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). In Illinois,
each of these three elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
33. These states include Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, and Utah. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.47.040 (West 2004);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 401(b) (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (West
2005); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-2 (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. §35-36-23 (West 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.120 (West 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 768.36 (West 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-103 (2005); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-9-3 (West 2005); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. 314 (West 2005); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 17-24-20 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-26-14 (2004); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-16a-102 (West 2005).
34. Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 385, 391 (1863).
35. Id. at 391-92.
36. People v. Munroe, 154 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ill. 1958). This test was a
merger between the irresistible impulse test and the “wrongfulness” prong of
the McNaughton test.
37. ILL. REV. STAT. 1987, ch. 38, par. 6-2(a). Illinois has expressly rejected
the McNaughton test. See People v. Nobles, 404 N.E.2d 330, 337 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980) (stating that the Illinois statute has abandoned the McNaughton test for
the Model Penal Code test).
38. Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 89-404 (West 1995).
39. Id. Illinois courts presume that all persons are sane. People v. Silagy,
461 N.E.2d 415, 425 (Ill. 1984). Therefore, the burden of proof is on the
defendant to demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence that he was
insane at the time he committed the crime. Wilson, 608 F.3d at 356. Although
at one time Illinois only required a showing by the “preponderance of the
evidence,” Illinois adopted this heightened standard of proof in 1995 at the
same time it eliminated the “failure to . . . conform his conduct to the
requirements of law” prong from its insanity defense. Id. at 353, 356.
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D. Birth of the Deific Decree Exception
Courts that have adopted the McNaughton test40 generally
apply an objective standard to assess whether the defendant knew
his act was wrong at the time he committed it.41 However, courts
have recognized an exception in cases where a defendant, due to
mental illness, objectively knew that his act was illegal and
morally wrong yet was commanded to perform it by a divine
entity.42 Under this exception—commonly referred to as the “deific
decree exception”—a defendant’s subjective belief in the command
justifies a “not guilty by reason of insanity” verdict.43
The deific decree exception was first articulated by Justice
Cardozo44 in People v. Schmidt.45 Schmidt was convicted of first
degree murder.46 On appeal, Schmidt claimed the trial court erred
in instructing the jury that the word “wrong” in the second prong
of the McNaughton test meant “contrary to the law of the state.”47
The Court agreed with Schmidt that in some cases a broader
definition of “wrong” is warranted.48 Justice Cardozo used the
following hypothetical to illustrate his point:
40. This exception has also been adopted by courts that adhere to the
Model Penal Code test. See, e.g., People v. Kando, 921 N.E.2d 1166, 1191-92
(Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (reversing a guilty verdict on the grounds that defendant
was unable to appreciate the criminality of his conduct because of his
hallucination that God commanded the act).
41. Wilson, 608 F.3d at 354.
42. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494.
43. Id.
44. One commentator noted that if Justice Cardozo had not authored the
opinion in Schmidt, “the deific decree exception would not exist.” Christopher
Hawthorne, “Deific Decree”: The Short, Happy Life of a Pseudo-Doctrine, 33
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1755, 1784 (2000).
45. People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945, 949 (N.Y. 1915). Prior to Schmidt, the
premise behind the exception was mentioned in Commw. of Mass. v. Rogers, 7
Metcalf 500, 500 (Mass. 1884). In Rogers, the court stated:
A common instance is where [the defendant] fully believes that the act
he is doing is done by the immediate command of God, and he acts under
the delusive but sincere belief that what he is doing is by the command
of a superior power, which supersedes all human laws, and the laws of
nature.
Id. at 503.
46. Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 945. Schmidt confessed to the murder of a woman
but claimed that a voice from God commanded him to kill her as a “sacrifice
and atonement.” Id. At trial, two doctors testified that Schmidt’s free will had
been overpowered by the command and opined that he was “insane.” Id.
Several doctors for the state testified that Schmidt was malingering. Id. The
jury did not believe Schmidt was “sincerely insane” and returned a verdict of
guilty. Id. The jury was right; on appeal Schmidt admitted that he feigned his
hallucinations. Id. at 945-46. He said that the victim died during a criminal
abortion, and that he initially lied about what happened so as not to implicate
the other parties involved. Id. at 945.
47. Id. at 946.
48. Id.
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A mother kills her infant child to whom she has been devotedly
attached. She knows the nature and quality of the act; she knows
that the law condemns it; but she is inspired by an insane delusion
that God has appeared to her and ordained the sacrifice. It seems a
mockery to say . . . she knows that the act is wrong.49

The deific decree exception did not make another court
appearance for more than sixty years later, in State v. Crenshaw.50
Crenshaw was charged with first degree murder.51 At trial,
Crenshaw argued that he acted upon suspicions that his wife
cheated on him and killed her because his Moscovite faith required
adulterous behavior be punished by death.52 Notwithstanding his
defense, a jury found him guilty.53 On appeal, Crenshaw raised the
same issue as Schmidt in People v. Schmidt.54 In Crenshaw, the
court ultimately found that the jury instructions were correct, yet,
the court adopted the exception articulated by Justice Cardozo in
Schmidt.55 The court reasoned that in cases where a defendant
acts under a deific command, it is unrealistic to hold him liable for
his actions.56
A defendant was not successful in invoking the deific decree
exception until State v. Cameron.57 Cameron was accused of
murdering his mother-in-law.58 At trial, four doctors testified that
49. Id. at 949. Justice Cardozo went on to say that “[the devotee of a
religious cult that enjoins polygamy or human sacrifice as a duty is not
thereby relieved from responsibility before the law. In such cases the belief,
however false according to our own standards, is not the product of the
disease.” Id. at 950. Because Schmidt feigned his insanity, the deficit decree
exception did not apply to him. Id. at 950.
50. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494. The deific decree exception first received its
“name” in Crenshaw. Id.
While on their honeymoon, Crenshaw “sensed” that his wife had been
unfaithful to him. Id. at 490. Crenshaw did not confront his wife with his
suspicions; rather, he took her to a motel room and beat her until she was
unconscious. Id. While his wife was unconscious, Crenshaw drove to a nearby
store and stole a knife. Id. Upon his return to the motel room, Crenshaw
stabbed his wife twenty-four times. Id. He then borrowed an ax from a local
farmer and returned to the hotel room to decapitate her. Id. Crenshaw
proceeded to cover up his crime by cleaning the motel room and hiding his
wife’s body parts in a remote area twenty-five miles away from the motel. Id.
at 491. After disposing of the body, Crenshaw continued driving until he came
across hitchhikers who he enlisted to help him dispose of the car. Id. After
Crenshaw told the hitchhikers about the murder, they contacted the police,
who then arrested him. Id.
51. Id. at 490.
52. Id. at 491.
53. Id. at 490.
54. Id. at 491.
55. Id. at 494. The court categorized Crenshaw as the “[t]he devotee of a
religious cult that enjoins . . . human sacrifice as a duty.” Id.
56. Id. at 501.
57. State v. Cameron, 674 P.2d 650, 654 (Wash. 1983).
58. Id. at 657. Cameron stabbed his mother-in-law more than seventy
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Cameron suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and that God
commanded him to commit the murder.59 Nevertheless, the jury
rejected Cameron’s insanity defense.60 On appeal to the
Washington Supreme Court, Cameron argued that the trial court
erred in instructing the jury with a definition of “wrong” that only
encompassed “legal wrongness.”61 Applying the deific decree
exception to the facts of the case, the Washington Supreme Court
reversed Cameron’s guilty verdict.62
Two important patterns emerge from these cases. First, a
defendant must have been acting directly under a divine command
at the time he committed the crime to be exempt from liability
under the deific decree exception. A defendant who simply
commits a crime in accordance with the tenets of his faith will not
be exempt.63 Second, the scope of the exception must be analyzed
on a case-by-case basis.64
III. ANALYSIS
A. Deific Decree Exception in Illinois
1. Illinois’s Application of the Deific Decree
An Illinois court first applied the deific decree exception in
1987 in People v. Garcia.65 Since Garcia, courts have only applied

times and left her body in a bathtub before departing for another state. Id. at
651.
59. Id. at 652. Cameron was hospitalized fifteen times within an eight-year
period leading up to the murder. Id. at 657.
60. Id. at 651. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the guilty
verdict. Id.
61. Id. at 653. Cameron made the same argument on appeal as Schmidt
and Crenshaw. Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 946; Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494.
62. Cameron, 674 P.2d at 654. However, the court noted that it “[did not]
see much or any distinction . . . in carrying out or executing a murder under
the direction of God or Crenshaw’s Moscovite religious beliefs . . . .” Id. at 658.
Other courts consider this distinction critical. See Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494
(differentiating between a hallucinatory command to commit a crime and a
choice to commit a crime in adhering to one’s religious beliefs).
63. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494.
64. Cameron, 674 P.2d at 654.
65. People v. Garcia, 509 N.E.2d 600, 605 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). Garcia and
his brother were living in the same house at the time of the crime. Id. at 600.
On the morning of June 30, 1983, Garcia entered the room where his brother
was sleeping and stabbed him repeatedly. Id. He then left the house, only to
return two hours later. Id. The police were notified, and Garcia was
subsequently arrested. Id. at 600-01.
Following his arrest, Garcia was evaluated by a psychiatrist. Id. at 602.
When asked about the incident, Garcia told the psychiatrist that “Astros” had
commanded him to kill his brother. Id. at 602-03. Garcia described “Astros” as
“spirits . . . which communicated with him.” Id. at 603. At trial, although the
psychiatrist testified that Garcia was psychotic, the court found Garcia guilty
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the exception in a handful of cases.66 Until recently, the deific
but mentally ill. Id. at 600.
On appeal, the First District Appellate Court of Illinois reversed
Garcia’s conviction on the grounds that Garcia’s religious hallucinations
“gravely impaired . . . his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law” at the time he committed the crime. Id. at 605.
66. See, e.g., People v. Baker, 625 N.E.2d 719, 732-33 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993);
People v. Wilhoite, 592 N.E.2d 48, 58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Wilson, 608 F.3d at
354; Kando, 921 N.E.2d at 1191-92 (noting that this exception has also been
adopted by courts that adhere to the Model Penal Code test).
In Wilhoite, the defendant, acting under the command of God, pushed
her nine-year-old daughter head first out the window of an eighth floor
apartment. Wilhoite, 592 N.E. 2d at 49. Wilhoite thought that the command
from God “was a test to see if [she] could get into heaven.” Id. at 50. Wilhoite’s
daughter managed to hang on to a curtain until a neighbor saw her and ran
into the apartment to pull her back inside. Id. at 49.
At Wilhoite’s bench trial, three psychiatrists for the defense testified
that Wilhoite, as a result of her psychotic condition, was “unable to conform
her behavior to the requirements of the law” at the time she committed the
crime. Id. at 50. A psychiatrist for the state testified that Wilhoite smoked
marijuana shortly before the incident and that her behavior was attributable
to the effects of the marijuana and not psychosis. Id. The trial court adopted
the state psychiatrist’s account of the incident and found the defendant guilty
of attempted murder. Id. at 58.
On appeal, the Court ignored the testimony of the State’s expert and
reversed the guilty verdict. Id. at 58. Relying on Justice Cardozo’s illustration
of the deific decree exception in Schmidt, the Court concluded that the
commands rendered Wilhoite incapable of conforming her conduct to the
requirements of the law. Id. at 57-58.
The Court adopted the same reasoning when it overturned the
defendant’s guilty verdict in Baker. Baker, 625 N.E.2d at 728-29. Baker was
charged with the murder of his parents. Id. at 720. While in custody, Baker
relayed the following account of what happened: He got into a heated debate
over “methods of religion” with his father. Id. at 724. He left temporarily to
retrieve a gun. Id. at 722. When he returned he told his father, “[t]he father
dies before the son.” Id. His father reacted by grabbing for his throat, and, in
response, Baker shot his father. Id. He then turned to his mother, who was in
the room at the time, and shot and stabbed her to death before fleeing the
scene. Id.
Six months before the killings Baker was diagnosed with schizophrenia
and treated with medication. Id. at 727. At trial, four doctors for the defense
affirmed Baker’s psychosis. Id. at 724-26.
The State did not call any experts to testify on its behalf, focusing
instead on the fact that Baker fled the scene of the crime to demonstrate that
he was not insane at the time he committed it. Id. at 729. The trial court
accepted the State’s argument and found Baker guilty but mentally ill. Id. at
720.
On appeal to the First District of Illinois Appellate Court, Baker argued
that “the trial court’s finding of guilty but mentally ill was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. . . .” Id. The Appellate Court agreed. Id. at
732-33. The Court relied on Wilhoite for the proposition that flight from a
crime scene is not necessarily indicative of sanity. Id. at 729. The court
concluded that the trial court had no basis for disregarding the testimony of
the four doctors who opined that Baker’s religious hallucinations had rendered
him incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law. Id. at
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decree exception was only invoked in cases that applied the old
compulsion-based insanity defense.67 However, in 1999, the First
District Illinois Appellate Court applied the exception under the
new non-compulsion based insanity defense. Thus, it appears that
Illinois courts will continue to apply the exception even under the
new insanity defense.68
A common factual pattern runs through Illinois deific decree
exception cases. All of the defendants committed their crimes
under the direct command of a “divine entity.”69 The crimes were
committed against someone living in close proximity to the
defendants.70 In each case the defendant was diagnosed with a
psychotic disorder subsequent to his crime.71 Moreover, in every
case but one, the family members or friends of the defendant
seriously questioned the defendant’s mental condition prior to the

729-30. Like the court in Garcia, the Baker court did not directly cite to
Schmidt, although it did cite extensively to Garcia. Id. at 728-29.
67. Baker, 625 N.E.2d at 728-29; Wilhoite, 592 N.E.2d at 58.
68. Kando, 921 N.E.2d at 1191-92. The First District Appellate Court of
Illinois in Kando reversed the defendant’s guilty but mentally ill verdict on the
grounds that, as a result of his religious hallucinations, Kando was unable to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct at the time he committed the crime.
Id. at 1199.
Kando stabbed his neighbor after his neighbor told him that, “Jesus is
black.” Id. at 1175. Although critically injured, the neighbor survived. Id. at
1173. After the incident, Kando told a psychiatrist that that he been receiving
messages from Jesus “telling him that he was the Angel in human form on
earth and that he should kill and lock up Satan for 1,000 years.” Id. at 1176.
At the time of the incident, Kando thought his neighbor was Satan. Id. at
1182.
At trial, two doctors testified that Kando had been hospitalized for
psychiatric problems on twenty-seven occasions prior to committing the crime.
Id. at 1192. Although the doctors arrived at different diagnoses, they agreed
that Kando’s “hyper-religious hallucinations” had overpowered his ability to
“appreciate the criminality of his conduct.” Id. at 1177, 1183.
Notwithstanding, the trial court found Kando guilty but mentally ill of
aggravated battery and attempted murder. Id. at 1168.
On appeal, the First District Appellate Court reversed Kando’s
conviction. The Court stated that the trial court had no basis for rejecting the
doctors’ testimony. Id. at 1191. The Court relied on Wilhoite, Baker and Garcia
as precedent in reaching its ultimate conclusion that Kando’s hallucinations
rendered him incapable of appreciating the criminality of his crime. Id. at
1199-1200. The Court was not bothered by the fact that these cases applied
the old compulsion-based insanity defense. Id. at 1200.
See also State v. Wilson, 700 A.2d 633, 641-42 (Conn. 1997) (serving as
another example of a jurisdiction that has applied the deific decree exception
to the Model Penal Code test).
69. Kando, 921 N.E.2d at 1191; Baker, 625 N.E.2d at 722; Wilhoite, 592
N.E.2d at 55; Garcia, 509 N.E.2d at 603.
70. Kando, 921 N.E.2d at 1168; Baker, 625 N.E.2d at 720; Wilhoite, 592
N.E.2d at 49; Garcia, 509 N.E.2d at 600.
71. Kando, 921 N.E.2d at 1177; Baker, 625 N.E.2d at 724; Wilhoite, 592
N.E.2d at 55; Garcia, 509 N.E.2d at 601.
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crime.72 In fact, several of the defendants were hospitalized for
mental health problems on numerous occasions in the past.73
Finally, in every case the defendant was initially found “guilty” or
“guilty but mentally ill” by a trial court and then subsequently
found “not guilty by reason of insanity” by an appellate court.74
2. The Deific Decree Under Fire
The deific decree exception came under fire in the recent
Seventh Circuit decision in Wilson v. Gaetz.75 The Court expressed
concerns that the exception violates the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause because it gives preferential treatment to
“religious” hallucinations over “non-religious” ones.76 A defendant
who murders someone because he was commanded to by God for
example, may be exempt from liability under the deific decree
exception, whereas a defendant who commits the same murder
under the command of his dog is not exempt.77
Despite its concerns regarding the constitutionality of the
exception, the Seventh Circuit noted that Justice Cardozo’s logic in
Schmidt “has lost none of its intellectual power by the passage of
years.”78 The Court left the issue of the deific decree exception’s
constitutionality undecided and concluded that the exception
continues to be available to defendants in Illinois.79

72. Kando, 921 N.E.2d at 1171; Baker, 625 N.E.2d at 723-24; Garcia, 509
N.E.2d at 602.
73. Kando, 921 N.E.2d at 1200; Baker, 625 N.E.2d at 720.
74. Kando, 921 N.E.2d at 1168; Baker, 625 N.E.2d at 720; Wilhoite, 592
N.E.2d at 58; Garcia, 509 N.E.2d at 600.
75. Wilson v. Gaetz, 608 F.3d 347, 354 (7th Cir. 2010). In Wilson, the
defendant suffered delusions for more than fifteen years that the “Catholics”
were conspiring against him. Id. at 349. The defendant’s delusions led him to
kill his boss, one of the “conspirators.” Id. at 348.
Although the defendant’s delusions had a “religious slant,” the deific
decree exception was not available to him because he was not acting directly
under a divine command at the time he committed the crime. Id. at 354.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Corky Siemaszko et al., Son of Sam; New York’s Summer of
DAILY
NEWS,
Terror:
30
Years
Later—The
Letter,
N.Y.
http://www.nydailynews.com/features/sonofsam/letter.html (last visited Oct.
16, 2012) (discussing the case of David Berkowitz, who murdered six and
wounded seven others in New York City between 1976 and his arrest in 1977).
Berkowitz eventually pled guilty to avoid the death penalty. David Berkowitz,
TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/times
N.Y.
topics/people/b/david_berkowitz/index.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2012). The
deific decree exception was not applicable to Berkowitz because the
“commander” was a dog rather than a divine entity. Id.
78. Wilson, 608 F.3d at 354-55.
79. Id.
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B. The Scope of the Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause prohibits the federal government
from passing a law “respecting an establishment of religion.”80 One
would think the phrasing “an establishment” rather than “the
establishment” illustrates that the framers of the Constitution
intended to prohibit one particular religion from being the “favored
religion” as opposed to disfavoring religious preferences in
general.81 Courts, however, have interpreted the Establishment
Clause not only to forbid the establishment of an “official religion,”
but also to prohibit the government from giving undue preference
to religion over non-religion and vice-versa.82 Consequently, under
the Establishment Clause, a law cannot “aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another.”83
The Supreme Court has adopted the three-prong “Lemon
Test” to determine whether legislation is constitutional under the
Establishment Clause.84 To be upheld a law must: (a) serve a
secular purpose; (b) not have the primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion; and (c) not promote “excessive government
entanglement with religion.”85 Although an Establishment Clause
violation results if any one of these three prongs is violated,86 the
Lemon test allows for some leeway.87 For instance, a law may be
religiously motivated as long as it simultaneously serves a secular
purpose.88 Moreover, a law may have the “incidental effect” of
promoting a particular religion as long as its “primary effect” is

80. U.S. CONST. amend I. Although the Bill of Rights explicitly refers only
to the federal government, the Fourteenth Amendment makes some of the
protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights applicable to the states as well.
Doug
Linder,
The
Incorporation
Debate,
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/incorp.htm (last visited
Dec. 31, 2012).
81. MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE
AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 14 (American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research 1978).
82. Establishment Clause, CORNELL UNIV. L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST. (Aug.
19, 2010), http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/establishment_clause.
83. Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Tp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
84. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987). There are two other
tests that the Supreme Court has applied in Establishment Clause cases.
Those tests are the “Coercion Test” and the “Endorsement Test”. Because the
Supreme Court has applied the Lemon Test to evaluate other religious
exemptions to criminal liability, this Comment focuses on the Lemon Test.
Penny J. Meyers, Lemon is Alive and Kicking: Using the Lemon Test to
Determine the Constitutionality of Prayer at High School Graduation
Ceremonies, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 231, 242-43 (1999).
85. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
86. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
87. BARRY W. LYNN ET AL., THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 3 (S. Ill.
Univ. Press 1995).
88. Id.
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not to advance or inhibit religion.89 Finally, the test allows for
“entanglement” between government and religion that falls short
of “excessive.”90
C. Escaping Liability on Religious Grounds
Courts have not directly addressed whether the deific decree
exception violates the Establishment Clause. However, in other
circumstances courts have held that religious exemptions are not
valid defenses to criminal liability. For instance, a growing
number of jurisdictions are holding that child abuse and neglect
statutes that provide exceptions for religious observers violate the
Establishment Clause.91 These exceptions allow a parent to escape
criminal liability for failing to secure medical treatment for his
sick child if the parent has religious objections to the treatment.92
A typical exception is worded as follows:
A person does not commit an offense under . . . [this] section . . . [if]
he provides a child . . . or a dependent spouse with remedial
treatment by spiritual means alone in accordance with the tenets
and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination by a
duly accredited practitioner thereof in lieu of medical treatment.93

Exceptions like the one noted above do not withstand the
Lemon Test.94 First, they serve no purpose other than to
accommodate those whose religious beliefs do not coincide with the
beliefs of the “majority.”95 Moreover, such exceptions have the
primary effect of advancing religion by giving preferential
treatment to religious parents over non-religious parents.96 In
some cases these exceptions also single out a select group of
religious parents—namely, those who belong to “recognized
churches
or
religious
denominations”—for
preferential

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Walker v. Super. Ct, 763 P.2d 852, 876 (Cal. 1988) (holding
that a statute absolving parents from liability for relying on “religion-based”
methods to treat their children violated the Establishment Clause); State v.
Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d 931, 935-36 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1984) (holding that
innocent children should not be denied equal protection under the guise of
religious freedom because they may eventually disagree with their parents’
religious beliefs).
92. See James G. Dwyer, Spiritual Treatment Exemptions to Child Medical
Neglect Laws: What We Outsiders Should Think, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 147,
147 (2000) (explaining that there are various views on whether the law should
permit individuals to avoid legal responsibility when failing to obtain
adequate medical treatment for their children because of their religious
beliefs).
93. ALA. CODE § 13A-13-6 (2012).
94. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d at 934.
95. Id. at 934-35.
96. Id. at 934.
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treatment.97 Parents who hold sincere religious beliefs that are not
“officially recognized” are excluded just like the “non-religious.”98
Religious exceptions to neglect and abuse statutes also result
in “excessive governmental entanglement with religion.”99 The
state should not be involved in questions that will inevitably arise
in determining whether a parent should be exempt from liability
such as, “What constitutes a ‘recognized religious denomination?’”
and, “Are the parent’s religious beliefs sincere?”100
True, a parent has the right to believe that medical
intervention is not necessary because prayer alone will cure his
child; however, courts differentiate between belief and action.101 A
parent can believe whatever he wants, but does not have the
absolute right to act on his beliefs.102 With religious exemptions to
child abuse and neglect statutes, a child’s life is too high a price to
pay for religious “freedom.”103
Similarly, courts have held that religious exemptions to
compulsory vaccination laws violate the Establishment Clause.104
Under these exemptions, parents can refuse to vaccinate their
children if they have religious objections to the vaccination.105
However, only parents who belong to “recognized religious
denominations” are able to invoke such exceptions.106
Religious exemptions to compulsory vaccination laws fail the
Lemon Test for the same reasons as religious exemptions to
neglect and abuse statutes. These exceptions not only differentiate
between religious and non-religious parents, but also give
preferential treatment to parents who subscribe to “recognized”
denominations over those that hold sincere but not “officially
recognized” religious beliefs.107 They also involve the same types of
questions that states simply have no business answering.108
From these examples it is apparent that religious exemptions
to criminal statutes pose serious Establishment Clause concerns.

97. See Dwyer, supra note 92, at 147-76 (providing several examples of
statutes that limit religious beliefs to those recognized by a state).
98. Walker, 763 P.2d at 876.
99. Id. at 874.
100. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d at 934.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Rita Swan, When Faith Fails Children, THE HUMANIST (Nov. 2000),
http://www.thehumanist.org/ humanist/swan_neglect.html.
104. McCarthy v. Boozman, 212 F. Supp. 2d 945, 948 (W.D. Ark. 2002);
Dalli v. Bd. of Educ., 267 N.E.2d 219, 223 (Mass. 1971).
105. McCarthy, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 949; Dalli, 267 N.E.2d at 221-23.
106. 212 F. Supp. 2d at 949; 267 N.E.2d at 223.
107. 212 F. Supp. 2d at 949; 267 N.E.2d at 223.
108. 212 F. Supp. 2d at 949.
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D. Constitutionality of the Deific Decree Exception
Applying these examples to the deific decree exception, the
Seventh Circuit in Gaetz had good reason to question the
constitutionality of the exception.109 Like the abuse and neglect
and immunization exemptions, the deific decree exception gives
preferential treatment to the “religious” over the “non-religious.”110
True, insane defendants do not “choose” their religious beliefs
like the parents in neglect and abuse and immunization exception
cases because their beliefs are a byproduct of their mental
disorders.111 Nevertheless, the effect of the exemptions in all three
cases is the same: the religious believers—irrespective of the
“reason” for their beliefs—escape liability for their crimes while
the non-religious do not. This preferential treatment has the
“primary effect of advancing religion” and thus fails the second
prong of the Lemon Test.112
The deific decree exception also fails the first prong of the
Lemon Test. The exception serves no purpose other than to
provide a “break” to defendants who suffer from religious
command hallucinations. Although one can argue that the
exception ensures that defendants suffering from religious
command hallucinations are not punished for conduct they cannot
control, this argument does not address why “non-religious
command hallucinations” are not treated similarly. Does it really
matter who the “commander” is if the defendant is truly suffering
from a mental disorder? After all, “[o]nce we concede that the
defendant has been compelled to act, the source of the compulsion
[should] become[] irrelevant.”113
The deific decree exception also cannot survive under the
third prong of the Lemon Test. Although doctors can assist the
court in assessing whether a defendant is malingering,114 it will
remain up to the court to determine whether the defendant’s
“commander” was, in fact, a divine entity and whether the
defendant truly was “subsumed” by the command.115 Moreover,
courts are left to decide whether the command was sufficiently
“direct” in its instructions to the defendant. Like with the neglect
109. Wilson, 608 F.3d at 354.
110. Id.
111. See Causes of Mental Illness, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/anxietypanic/mental-health-causes-mental-illness (last visited Dec. 31, 2012) (stating
that mental illnesses are attributable to a number of biological factors).
112. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
113. Hawthorne, supra note 44, at 1784.
114. See Malingering and Deception, PSYCHOLEGAL & CLINICAL
ASSESSMENT
SERVICES,
http://psycholegalassessments.com/areas-ofexpertise/malingering-and-deception/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2012) (noting that
doctors are frequently asked to conduct malingering evaluations to determine
whether a defendant is suffering from mental illness or merely “faking it”).
115. Cameron, 674 P.2d at 654.
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and abuse and vaccination exceptions, these kinds of
determinations cross the line into “excessive entanglement of
government with religion” in violation of the third prong of the
Lemon Test.
Because the deific decree exception fails all three prongs of
the Lemon Test, it is reasonable to conclude that, although the
exception may seem logical at first glance, it is not constitutional
under the Establishment Clause.
IV. PROPOSAL
A. The Supreme Court’s Approach to Avoiding Establishment
Clause Concerns in the Past
The Establishment Clause concerns implicated by the deific
decree exception can be avoided if courts adopt the same broad
definition of “religion beliefs” that the Supreme Court adopted in
United States v. Seeger and Welsh v. United States.116
In Seeger and Welsh, the Supreme Court considered whether
a federal statute that exempted from the military draft those
opposed to war “by reason of religious training and belief” was
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.117 In arriving at
its conclusion that the statute was constitutional, the Court
adopted a broad construction of the definition of “religious belief”
to side-step Establishment Clause concerns.118 The Court defined a
religious belief as any “meaningful belief occupying in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those
admittedly qualified for the exemption.”119 Under this definition a

116. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1970); United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965). With the exception of Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972), the Supreme Court has not directly discussed the
definition of “religious beliefs” since Welsh and Seeger. Jeffrey Omar Usman,
Defining Religion: The Struggle to Define Religion Under the First Amendment
and the Contributions and Insights of Other Disciplines of Study Including
Theology, Psychology, Sociology, The Arts, and Anthropology, 83 N.D. L. REV.
123, 159 (2007).
117. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 335; Seeger, 380 U.S. at 164-65.
118. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 338; Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166. This definition was a
substantial departure from past definitions of “religious belief” which revolved
around Christianity. For example, in Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. United States the Court held that a Mormon belief in polygamy was
not a religious belief because it was “contrary to the spirit of Christianity, and
of the civilization which Christianity has produced in the Western world.” 136
U.S. 1, 49 (1890). In Torcaso v. Watkins, the Supreme Court finally expanded
the definition of “religious belief” to encompass all religions, including
nontheistic religions like Buddhism and Secular Humanism. 367 U.S. 488, 495
(1961).
119. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339; Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176. Seeger believed in
“goodness and virtue for their own sakes,” a belief he claimed imposed upon
him a duty to refrain from taking the life of another. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166.
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person does not have to believe in God or any other divine entity;
as long as the person’s beliefs serve a “religion-like function” in his
life, he is exempt from serving in the draft.120
Despite the broad definition of “religious belief” that the
Supreme Court adopted in Seeger and Welsh, the Court did add a
few caveats. First and most importantly, the Court noted that a
religious belief must be sincerely held for the believer to qualify for
the exemption.121 If the belief is not asserted in good faith, the
believer’s claim is denied without further consideration.122 In a
later case, the Supreme Court further elaborated that the belief
does not even have to be “acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others” provided that it is sincere.123
Second, the belief cannot be based upon the believer’s
opinions on politics, sociology, or philosophy.124 For example, a
person who opposes military expenditure abroad because he
believes in isolationist government policy will be unsuccessful
claiming his beliefs are “religious.” Similarly, a person who
disagrees that the United States should be involved in a particular
war but is not opposed to war in general will not be exempt.125
Finally, a mere belief in a “personal moral code” standing
alone is insufficient to constitute a “religious belief.”126 Rather, to
be exempt, one’s personal moral code must “impose upon him a
duty of conscience to refrain from participat[ion].”127 This sense of
duty reinforces the notion that the belief functions in a parallel
way to religion in the believer’s life.128

Welsh believed that war was “unethical.” Welsh, 398 U.S. at 338. Neither
petitioner expressed a “traditional” belief in God or any other divine entity. Id.
at 340-41; Seeger, 380 U.S. at 193. In fact, Welsh adamantly denied that his
views were religious. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340-41.
Under the Supreme Court’s broad construction of the definition of
“religious belief,” both petitioners qualified as conscientious objectors. Welsh,
398 U.S. at 343-44; Seeger, 380 U.S. at 187. In both cases the Court reasoned
that the petitioners’ beliefs were indistinguishable from the “traditional”
devotion to God, which compels someone to pursue goodness and avoid evil.
Welsh, 398 U.S. at 343-44; Seeger, 380 U.S. at 186.
120. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339.
121. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339; Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165.
122. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339; Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165.
123. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
In other words, the command hallucination only has to make sense to the
defendant, not the rest of the world.
124. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 336; Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165.
125. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 437-38 (1971) (denying
conscientious objector status to a petitioner who asserted it was “his duty as a
faithful Catholic to discriminate between ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ wars” and opined
that the Vietnam War fell into the latter category).
126. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 336; Seeger, 380 U.S. at 164.
127. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340.
128. Id.
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B. Applying a Broad Definition of Religion to the Deific Decree
Exception
Courts can apply the Supreme Court’s broad definition of
religion from Seeger and Welsh to avoid the Establishment Clause
concerns implicated by the deific decree exception. Based on the
Seeger and Welsh definition of “religious beliefs,”129 as long as the
defendant’s “commander” serves a parallel function in the
defendant’s life to that of a religious entity (or is, in fact, a
religious entity), the defendant would be exempt from liability
under the deific decree exception.
Courts already apply elements of this definition in assessing
deific decree exception claims. For example, courts begin their
analysis of a defendant’s claim by considering the sincerity of his
belief in the command hallucination.130 With the assistance of
psychiatrists and other mental health professionals, courts
determine whether the defendant is actually suffering from a
mental defect or merely malingering.131 If a defendant’s beliefs are
determined to be insincere, the defendant is not eligible for
exemption from liability under the deific decree exception.
Moreover, courts already look to whether the belief that led
the defendant to commit the crime stemmed from his “personal
moral code” or “personal opinions” rather than a command
hallucination. Only a mentally ill defendant who acts under a
direct command from God is exempt; the defendant who kills
someone merely because he thinks that person “deserved it”
cannot escape liability.132 Likewise, as Justice Cardozo articulated
in Schmidt: “The devotee of a religious cult that enjoins polygamy
or human sacrifice as a duty is not thereby relieved from
responsibility before the law.”133
129. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339; Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
130. See Wilson, 700 A.2d at 633 (stating that “a defendant would be
entitled to prevail under [the deific decree exception] if, as a result of his
mental disease or defect, he sincerely believes that society would approve of
his conduct if it shared his understanding of the circumstances underlying his
actions”) (emphasis in original); Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 787 (Ohio
2006) (citing Guiteau’s Case, 10 F. 161, 170 (D.D.C. 1882)) (stating that under
the deific decree exception a defendant “must act under the delusive but
sincere belief that what he is doing is by the command of a superior power,
which supersedes all human laws, and the laws of nature”).
One may think it is entirely illogical for a defendant to honestly believe
God commanded him to commit a crime; however, as the Supreme Court
stated in Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., the religious belief
only has to be logical to the defendant. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 726 (1981). Moreover, is this belief really that farfetched given that God commanded Abraham to kill his son in Genesis 22:118?
131. PSYCHOLEGAL & CLINICAL ASSESSMENT SERVICES, supra note 114.
132. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494.
133. Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 950.
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There are a few courts that have already broadly construed
the definition of “religious beliefs” in finding defendants not guilty
by reason of insanity under the deific decree exception. For
example, in People v. Garcia, the First District Appellate Court of
Illinois reversed the guilty verdict of a defendant who killed his
brother under the direct command of the “Astros.”134 The only
mention of “conventional” religion in Garcia was a statement made
by the defendant that he had seen visions of the devil two years
prior to the murder.135 Similarly, in People v. Baker, the First
District Appellate Court of Illinois reversed the guilty verdict of a
defendant who killed his parents despite the fact that the
defendant made only vague references to religion in his
confession.136
By adopting the broad definition of “religious beliefs”
espoused by the Supreme Court in Seeger and Welsh,137 courts can
side-step the Establishment Clause concerns mentioned by the
Seventh Circuit in Gaetz.138
C. Aren’t All Command Hallucinations Created Equal?
Courts can avoid the Establishment Clause concerns
implicated by the deific decree exception altogether by dropping
the distinction between “religious” command hallucinations and
non-religious ones.139 That way, the courts are not giving
preference to religion but recognizing instead that a defendant
commanded to commit a crime by his dog is no less mentally ill
than one commanded by God to commit the same crime.140
Ultimately, a command hallucination is a command
hallucination, irrespective of who the “commander” is.141 Does it
really matter whether the defendant was commanded by God to
134. Garcia, 509 N.E.2d at 605.
135. Id. at 602.
136. Baker, 625 N.E.2d at 724. The only religious references in Baker were
the defendant’s argument with his father over “methods of religion” and the
defendant’s apocalyptical statement (“the father dies before the son”) prior to
the murders. Id. The case does not mention whether an inquiry was made into
the nature of the argument between the defendant and his father.
137. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339; Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
138. Wilson, 608 F.3d at 354.
139. The vast majority of deific decree exception cases involve a direct
command issued by God to the defendant to commit a crime. Lundgren, 440
F.3d at 784-86.
140. This would allow the “Berkowitzes” of the world an exemption from
liability irrespective of the fact that their crimes were not religiously
motivated. See generally Siemaszko, supra note 77 (discussing the
circumstances around Berkowitz’s case at length).
141. See Hawthorne, supra note 44 (“[T]his exception makes less sense than
meets the eye. If all of the above criteria are in place—paranoid schizophrenia,
auditory hallucinations, compulsive behavior—do we really care which voice is
commanding the defendant?”).
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murder his brother, as opposed to his cat or Elvis Presley?142 After
all, a defendant who believes God is commanding his crime is no
more capable of appreciating the “wrongness” of his conduct than
one who believes a “non-divine source” issued him the command.
Mental health professionals do not differentiate between “religious
command hallucinations” and non-religious ones; why should the
courts?143
V. CONCLUSION
For the time being, the deific decree exception remains a
viable defense to criminal charges in Illinois.144 It appears that
Illinois courts will continue to apply the exception even under the
amended non-compulsion based insanity defense.145 Although the
Seventh Circuit in Gaetz rightfully noted that the deific decree
exception may be unconstitutional under the Establishment
Clause,146 a broad construction of “religious commands” avoids
Establishment Clause issues. In practice, one Illinois appellate
court has already adopted this broad construction in preserving
the deific decree exception.147 Only time will tell whether the
Illinois Supreme Court will join this court and save the deific
decree exception to the insanity defense.

142. Id.
143. See Hallucinations, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MENTAL DISORDERS,
http://www.minddisorders.com/Flu-Inv/Hallucinations.html (last visited Oct.
16, 2011) (discussing command hallucinations in depth without differentiating
between religious and nonreligious commands hallucinations).
144. Wilson, 608 F.3d at 354-55.
145. Kando, 921 N.E.2d at 1191-92.
146. Wilson, 608 F.3d at 354-55.
147. Baker, 625 N.E.2d at 724; Garcia, 509 N.E.2d at 602.

